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Introduction
Usually, cooperative g a m e theory is concerned with predicting how rational players will d i stribute the gains that are obtained through cooperation. The standard approach in the literature is to represent the underlying situation as a g a m e i n c haracteristic function form. A solution concept species the distribution of payos for each g a m e . This formulation (usually) either implicitly assumes that the grand coalition will f o r m , o r s p e cies a n exogenous coalition structure. However, the distribution of payos will depend on the structure of coalitions which form, s i nce this w i ll typically determine the total amount that is available for distribution. Moreover, the eventual coalitional structure itself will usually be inuenced b y what players expect to get in dierent coalitions.
Hence, the ideal approach is one in w h i c h the coalition structure as well as the distribution of payos are determined simultaneously.
It is natural in this context to adopt the so-called Nash program, and try and support the prediction of any e ndogenous theory of coalition formation and associated solution concept as a noncooperative e q uilibrium outcome o f à l a r g e r ' game i n w h i c h the negotiation process is e m bedded. Since the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982) , there have b e e n a n umber of papers in this tradition. Of particular relevance for present purposes are Binmore (1985) , Chatterjee et al. (1993) , Gul (1989) , Perry and Reny (1994) and Selten (1981) , where the negotiation process associated w i th characteristic function games i s e x plicitly m odelled. While Gul (1989) and Perry and Reny (1994) derived negotiation processes leading up to specic solution concepts (the Shapley value and the core respectively), Chatterjee et al. (1993) formulated a generalization of the Rubinstein alternating oers model to represent the negotiation process.
Amongst other results, they a l so showed that the grand coalition need not always form even in strictly superadditive games. Of course, all these papers provide an endogenous theory of coalition formation as well as a prediction about the distribution of payos. 1 There are two points of departure from this literature in the current paper.
First, we f o c us attention on Myerson's (1977) cooperation structures 2 , rather than coalition structures. A cooperation structure is a graph whose vertices are identied with the players. A link between two players means that these players can carry on meaningful direct negotiations with each other. Notice that a coalition structure is a s p e cial kind of cooperation structure where two members i and j are linked if and only i f they are in the same c oalition. 3 Second, following Aumann and Myerson (1988) , we m odel situations in which the eventual distribution of payos is determined i n two distinct stages or periods. The rst period is devoted t o l i nk formation only. During this period, the players cannot enter into binding agreements of any k ind, either on the nature of the link formation, or on the subsequent division of payos. In the second period, no new links can be formed, but players negotiate over the division of the payo, given the cooperation structure which has formed in the rst stage.
The goal of this paper is to analyse the endogenous formation of cooperation structures in this setting. In order to do this, we assume that in the rst stage of the above process, agents' decisions on whether or not to form a link with other agents can be represented as a game in strategic f o r m . 4 In the link 1 See also Sengupta and Sengupta (1994) , who determine the coalition structure and distribution o f p a y os simultaneously, a l though not in the tradition of the Nash program.
2 See van den Nouweland (1993) for a survey of recent research o n games with coooperation structures. 3 Aumann and Myerson (1988) give examples of negotiation situations which can be modelled by cooperation structures, but not b y c o alition structures. 4 This g a m e w as originally i n troduced by M y erson (1991) (p. 448). See also Hart and Kurz (1983) , who discuss a similar strategic-form game i n the context of the endogenous formation of coalition structures. In contrast, Aumann and Myerson (1988) model the process of l i nk formation game, each player announces a set of players w i th whom he or she wants to form a link. A l ink is f o r m ed between i and j if both players want the link. Given the announcements of the n players, this specication gives the cooperation structure. Suppose there is a rule o r s o l ution which d e termines a distribution of payos for eachcooperation structure. This, then, also gives the payo function of the strategic form game. S i nce this is a well-dened strategic form game, w e can use any noncooperative e quilibrium concept to analyse the game.
Suppose now that the rule w h i c h d e termines payos for each cooperation structure has the property that no agent w ants to unilaterally break a l i nk with any player. Since no player wants to brea k a l i nk, and it needs the consent of two players to form an additional link, any cooperation structure can be sustained a s a N ash equilibrium. W e, therefore, use renements of the Nash equilibrium concept. In particular, we e m ploy undominated Nash equilibrium, coalition-proof equilibrium, and the argmax set of weighted p otential games.
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Our principal conclusion is that for a wide class of solutions, these equilibrium renements all l e ad to the formation of the full cooperation structure or cooperation structures which a r e p ayo-equivalent to this structure. An important by-product of our analysis is a characterization of weighted M yerson values which are a generalization of weighted Shapley values t o g a m es with cooperation structures. We show that weighted Myerson values are the only solution concepts for games with cooperation structurs which s a t i sfy an eciency r equirement and which generate linking games that are weighted potential games.
The plan of this paper i s as follows. In section 2 we provide some basic denitions, including those of cooperation structures and solutions for games with cooperation structures. Somè reasonable' properties on such s o l utions formation a s a g a m e o f p erfect information. W e d i scuss this issue in more detail in section 3. 5 The latter is dened in section 5.
are introduced, and some i m plications are derived. Section 3 contains a discussion of dierent w a ys of modelling the process of link formation. Endogenous cooperation structures corresponding to undominated Nash equilibrium and c oalition-proof Nash equilibrium are determined in section 4. Section 5 contains the characterization of weighted Myerson values, and also shows that the argmax set of the weighted potential corresponds to the full cooperation structure and payo-equivalent structures. We conclude in s e ction 6.
Cooperation Structures and Solutions
Let (N;v) b e a T Uc oalitional game, where N = f1; 2; : : : ; n gdenotes the nite player set and v is a real-valued function on the family 2 N of all subsets of N with v(;) = 0. Throughout this paper, we will assume that v is superadditive 6 .
A cooperation structure is a graph g = ( N;L) w h e re N is the set of vertices, and L is the edge set. A n edge will also be called a link, and denoted by l; l 0 etc. For any S N, w e s a y that players i; j2 Sare connected in S if there exists a path from i to j that uses only vertices in S. The relation`connected in N' i s a n e quivalence relation on N. T h e e quivalence classes of this r e lation are the connected c omponents of the graph g.
We follow Aumann and Myerson (1988) in i n terpretin g a l ink between two players as meaning that these players can carry on meaningful direct negotiations with each other. The negotiation to form links takes place i n a p r e liminary period when \for one reason or another, one cannot enter i n to binding agreements of any k ind (such as those relating to subsequent d i visions of the payo..)".
7
A solution is a mapping which a s s i g n s a n e lement i n I R n to each T U 7 Aumann and Myerson (1988) , page 187. See also Myerson (1977) . 
Now, dene v g : 2 N ! I R b y
For instance, for a n y g = ( N;L), the Shapley v alue of the associated game (N; v g ) is a solution for (N;v;L), and has come to be called the Myerson value. 8 Similarly, weighted Myerson values o f ( N;v;L) are the weighted Shapley values of (N; v g ).
A class of solutions which w i ll play a prominent role in this paper is the class satisfying the following`reasonable' properties on a solution below.
Component e ciency (CE) : F or all cooperation structures (N;L) and all
Weak link symmetry (WLS) : F or all i; j2 N , and all cooperation struc-
Improvement property (IP) : F or all i; j 2Nand all cooperation structures
These properties all h a v e v ery simple interpretations. Dutta and Ray (1989) corresponding to the associated g a m e ( N ; v g ) a l s o s a t i s e s t hese properties.
The three properties together i m ply a n i n teresting fourth property. T h i s i s t h e c o n t e n t o f the next l emma. 
Proof : Suppose for some i; j 2 N and (
Then, by W L S , w e m ust also have j (L) j (L [ f i; jg). But then, since v is superadditive, and satises CE, there must exist k 6 2 fi; j gsuch that
Remark 1: We will denote the property incorporated in equation (3) by Link Monotonicity. Note that Link Monotonicity is an appealing property i n its o wn right. It says that a player i should not be worse-o a s a r e sult o f forming a new link with some p l a y e r j . 9
Remark 2: It i s e asy to construct e xamples t o s h o w that the Component Eciency, W eak Link Symmetry, a n d I m provement properties are independent.
Another consequence of these three properties is d e rived in the next lemma.
We show that if the formation of a link fi; jg aects the payo of some other player k, t h e n i t m ust also aect the payos of both players that formed the new link. This property will b e u s e d l ater on in the paper.
Lemma 2 L et satisfy CE, WLS and IP. Then, for al l i; j2N , and al l
. But, in the latter case, CE and superadditivity i m ply that there exists a l 6 2 fi; jg
. This establishes t h e l e m m a.
While the three properties are all appealing and are satised by a large class of solutions, there are other solutions outside this class that seem t o b e appealing. One such solution is dened below.
For any i and L; let L i = ffi; jg j j 2 N;fi; jg 2 L g , the set o f l inks that are adjacent t o i , a n d l i = j L i j . L e t S i ( L ) d e note the connected c omponent o f L containing i. Then, the Proportional Links Solution, d e noted P , i s given by
for all L and all i 2 N. The solution P captures the notion that the more links a player has with other players, the better are his relative prospects in the subsequent n e gotiations over the division of the payo. Notice that this makes sense only when the players are equallỳ p o w erful' in the game ( N;v).
Otherwise, a big player m a y get more than smal l players even if he has fewer links. We l eave i t to the reader t o c heck that P satises CE and IP, but not WLS.
Modelling Negotiation Processes
In this section, we use the 3-person majority game t o i llustrate some of the issues involved in the endogenous formation of cooperation structures. In particular, we discuss the Aumann-Myerson extensive form approach i n s o m e detail. W e point out that this approach, which i n v olves a sequential formation of links may be appropriate in situations where the negotiation process is`public', and where for one reason or another, bilateral negotiations take place in s o m e predetermined order. When these prerequisites are not met, it m a y b e m ore appropriate to model the`negotiation game' a s a g a m e i n strategic form. T h i s i s the approach adopted in this paper, and it is dened more formally later on in this section. Aumann and Myerson (1988) A t a n y point o f t i m e , the entire history of links formed or rejected is known to the players, so that it is a game of perfect i nformation. Some cooperation graph g will form at the end of the process. The payo to player i is then i (v g ), that
is, the Shapley v alue of player i in the game v g .
Since the game i s n i te and of perfect information, it has subgame p e rfect equilibria in pure strategies. The`prediction' of the model is that only cooperation structures associated with subgame perfect equilibria will actually form as a result of negotiations between players.
Consider, for instance, the TU game v on the player s e t f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g dened b y
Suppose also that the rule species that the order of pairs is f1; 2g; f1; 3g; f2; 3g.
Then, the Aumann-Myerson prediction is that only one pair will f o r m a l ink.
Suppose the link f1; 2g is formed. Notice that either o f 1 a n d 2 g a i n b y f o r m ing an additional link with 3, provided the other p l a y e r does not form a link with 3.
Two further points need to be noted. First, if p l a y e r i forms a l ink with 3, then it is i n the interest of j (j 6 = i) to also link up with 3. Second, if al l links are formed, then players 1 and 2 are worse-o compared to the graph in which they alone form a link. Hence, the structure ff1; 2gg is sustained as an`equilibrium' by a p a i r o f m utual threats of the kind :
\If y ou form a link with 3, then s o w i ll I."
Of course, this k i nd of threat makes sense only if i will come t o know whether j has formed a link with 3. Moreover, i can acquire this information only i f the negotiation process is public. I f b i lateral negotiations are conducted secretly, then it m a y b e i n t h e i n terest of some pair to conceal the fact that they h a v e f o r m ed a link until the process of bilateral negotiations has come to an end.
It is a l so clear that if dierent p a i rs can carry out negotiations simultaneously and i f l i nks o n c e formed cannot be broken, then the mutual threats referred t o earlier cannot be carried out. 10 Thus, there are many contexts where considerations other than threats may have a n i m portant i nuence on the formation of links. For instance, suppose players 1 and 2 have already formed a link amongst themselves. Suppose also that neither player has as yet started negotiations with player 3. If 3 starts negotiations simultaneously with both 1 and 2, then 1 and 2 are in f a c t faced with a Prisoners' Dilemma situation. To s e e this, denote l and nl as the strategies of formi n g a l i nk with 3 and not forming a link with 3 respectively.
Then, the payos to 1 and 2 are described b y the following matrix (the rst entry in each box i s 1 ' s p a y o, while the second entry is 2's p a y o). 1 2 ) Note that l, that is forming a link with 3, is a dominant strategy for both players! Obviously, the complete graph may w ell form simply because players 1 and 2 cannot sign a binding agreement to abstain f r om formin g a l ink with 3.
In this paper, we m odel the negotiation process as a game in strategic form. The specic strategic form game that we will c onstruct was rst dened by M y erson (1991), and has subsequently been used b y Qin (1993) . This model is described b e l o w. 
for all s 2 5 i2N S i , w i th L(s) = ffi; j g j j 2 s i ; i 2 s j g
The interpretation of (5) and (6) We n o w d e ne some e quilibrium concepts for any 0 ( ). These will b e u s e d in section 4 below. 11 We again r e m i nd the reader that w e h a v e suppressed the underlying T Ugame ( N ;v ) i n order to simplify the notation.
The rst equilibrium concept that we consider is the undominated Nash The second equilibrium concept that will be discussed i s the CoalitionProof Nash Equilibrium. In order to dene the concept of Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium of 0(), we n e ed some m ore notation. In this section, we c haracterize the sets of equilibrium cooperation structures under the equilibrium concepts dened in the previous section.
Our principal objective i s t o s h o w that the equilibrium concepts dened in section 3 all lead to essentially complete cooperation structures for solutions satisfying the properties that are listed i n section 2.
Theorem 1 Let be a solution that satises CE, WLS and IP. Then, s is an undominated Nash equilibrium of 0(). Moreover, if s is an undominated Nash equilibrium of 0(), then L(s) i s e ssentially complete for .
Proof : First, we show that s i is undominated for all i 2 N (in fact, we e v e n s h o w t h a t i t i s w eakly dominant). 
Since s i and s 0i were chosen arbitrarily, this shows that s i 2 S u i (). Further, putting s 0i = s 0 i in (7), we also get that s i s a N ash equilibrium of 0(). So, we m a y c onclude that s 2 S u (). 13 We m ention this because Aumann and Myerson (1988) 
Suppose (8) 
But, (7) and (9) together show that s k dominates s k . So, i f s 2 S u ( ) , then (8) must hold with equality. T h e n i t f o l lows from lemma 2 that the payo s t o a l l players remain unchanged when going from s k01 to s k , s o
Since this argument can be repeated for k = 1 ; 2 ; : : Remark 3: We h a v e a n e x ample o f a s o l ution satisfying CE, WLS and IP, for which CPNE () 6 = fs j L(s) is essentially completeg. I n other w ords, there may b e s which is not in CPNE (), though L(s) is essentially complete.
We dened the Proportional Links Solution P in section 2, and pointed out that it does not satisfy WLS. It also turns out that the conclusions of theorem 2 are no longer valid in the linking game 0 ( P ). While w e do not have a n y general characterization results for 0( P ), we show b e l o w that complete structures will not necessarily be coalitionproof equilibria o f 0 ( P ) in the special case of the 3-player majority game. . Suppose i makes a further deviation. The only deviation which needs to be considered is if i re-establishes a l ink with k. Check that i's payo remains at 1 2 . S o , i n t h i s c a s e s c a n not be a coalition proof equilibrium.
Since N is a connected set in L(s), the only possibility is that there exist i and j such that both are connected to k, but not to each other. Then, both i and j have a p a y o of 1 4 . Let now i and j deviate, break links with k and form a link between each other. Then, their payo increases to 1 2 . Check that neither player has any further protable deviation. Again, this shows that s is not coalitionproof.
5 Weighted Potential Games Monderer and Shapley (1993) prove v arious properties of the class of potential games. 15 Their results make potential games particularly interesting, and prompt us to study the cla s s o f l inking games which are also potential games.
Let 0 = ( N ; S 1 ; : : : ; S n ; )b e a g a m e in strategic form, where for each i 2 N; S i is the strategy set of player i, a n d i s t he payo function. 
The game 0 is called a w -potential game if i t a d m i ts a w-potential. Monderer and Shapley (1993) point out that the argmax set o f a w eighted potential does not depend on a particular choice of a weighted potential, and hence can be used as an equilibrium renement. They also remark that this renement concept is supported by some e x perimental results.
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Moreover, the Fictitious Play process converges to the equilibrium set i n a c lass of games that contains the nite weighted potential games.
In this section, we rst show that the class of weighted Myerson values is precisely the class of solutions which satisfy component e ciency and which g e nerate l i nking games that are weighted potential games. Second, we show that strategies in the argmax set of these potential games result in the formation of essentially complete cooperation structures. 17 The second result, in conjunction with the results of the previous section, strengthens the case for the formation of essentially complete structures if the negotiation process is simultaneous.
Some m ore denitions and lemmas precede the main results of this section. 16 Monderer and Shapley (1993) point out that this m a y b e a m ere coincidence. See also Van Huyck et al. (1990) and Crawford (1991) . where we use eciency of the weighted Shapley value in the third equality.
To prove w-fairness, let g = ( N;L) be a cooperation structure and choose where the l ast equality follows from w-fairness of 2 . So, now we h a v e
( 1 3 ) I t can be easily seen that equality (13) ( 1
However, both 1 and 2 are component e cient s o l utions, so for each connected component S of (N;L), we h a v e
Now, combining (14) and (15) This proves that is w-fair.
The following lemma shows that each w eighted Myerson value generates a linking game that is a weighted potential game. 19 The proof of the latter half of the theorem is similar to the corresponding part of the proof of theorem 1, and is therefore omitted.
Conclusion
In this paper, we h a v e studied the endogenous formation of cooperation structures in superadditive T U -games using a strategic game approach. In this strategic game, e ach p l a y e r announces the set o f p l a y e rs with whom he or she wants to form a link, a n d a l ink is formed if both players want to form the link.
Given the resulting cooperation structure, the payos are determined b y s o m e exogenous solution for cooperative g a m e s with cooperation structures. We h a v e c o ncentrated on the cla s s o f s o l utions satisfying three appealing properties. We have shown that in this setting both the undominated N ash equilibrium and the Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium predict the formation of the full cooperation structure or some p a y o equivalent structure.
We also considered linking games that are weighted potential games and their argmax sets. It turned out that, under an eciency r e quirement, the class of solutions generating linking games that are weighted potential games is the class of weighted M y erson values. Further, the argmax set of the linking games that are weighted potential games predicts the formation of the full cooperation structure or some p a y o equivalent structure.
The results obtained in t h i s paper all point in the direction of the formation of the full cooperation structure in a superadditive e n vironment. However, as indicated in the text, these results are sensitive to the assumptions on solutions for cooperative game with cooperation structures that we m ade in the paper.
Further, the discussion in section 3 shows that in a context where links a r e formed sequentially rather than simultaneously o t her p r e dictions may prevail.
The conditional probability m entioned here is, by denition of the probabilities p w , equal to 
